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THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Francis C. Sulli-
van) Paul Hardin) III) John Huston) Frank R. Lacy) Daniel E. 
Murray, and George W. Pugh. Brooklyn: Foundation Press. 1966. 
Pp. 798. $12. 
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS. 
By Livingston Hall and Yale Kamisar. St. Paul: West. 1966. Pp. xx.ii, 
881. $12. 
One result of the avalanche of Supreme Court and lower court 
decisions on the procedural rights of criminal defendants has been 
the awakening of student interest in the administration of criminal 
justice. Instruction beyond the first-year criminal law course has 
blossomed in law schools throughout the nation, and criminal 
procedure is fast becoming one of the most popular elective courses 
in the law school curriculum. The experience at Stanford is not 
atypical. Until two years ago, criminal procedure was not regularly 
taught as a separate course, although, of course, some procedural 
issues were covered in the crowded first-year criminal law course and 
a few questions concerning the rights of criminal defendants were 
presented in the constitutional law and evidence courses. Two years 
ago, however, a criminal procedure course was offered which at-
tracted forty-five students, and last year the enrollment was 140-
nearly the size of the entire third-year class. 
With commendable rapidity, considering the recency of interest 
in the field, the ever-alert law book publishing industry has provided 
teachers and students of criminal procedure with the two books of 
materials here under review. The two works, while covering in the 
main the same material, differ widely in outlook and in organiza-
tion. Afodern Criminal Procedure is much the more conventional 
in both these respects. It concentrates almost entirely on the con-
stitutional areas, and groups its materials doctrinally. Thus, twelve 
of its seventeen chapters are clearly constitutional in focus. These 
include: "The Nature of Due Process"; "Arrest"; "Search and 
Seizure"; "Wire Tapping and Eavesdropping"; "The Right to 
Counsel"; "Police Interrogation"; "The Plea of Guilty"; "Trial by 
Newspaper"; "Double Jeopardy" and "Federal Habeas Corpus." 
Moreover, four of the remaining chapters deal with areas which in 
great measure are on the way to constitutionalization: "Entrap-
ment"; "Bail"; "Discovery"; and "Vagrancy Offenses." Although the 
book's preoccupation with constitutional doctrine unnecessarily 
restricts its coverage of the problems of criminal procedure, it 
contains more than enough material to occupy fully a three-hour 
semester course. Indeed, the materials fairly bristle with difficult, 
unsettled, and fascinating issues. 
Although the chapters of the Hall and Kamisar work vary in 
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quality, on the whole they are excellent. The two most important, 
"Search and Seizure" and "Interrogation," are not only complete 
but a model of succinctness and intelligent editing; they are replete 
with astute questions that point to future problems and a fine 
selection of the important comments. In fact, only the chapter on 
federal habeas corpus, which, considering its importance, is far too 
skimpy (it contains only Fay v. Noia, Henry v. Mississippi, and 
Townsend v. Sain), and the chapter on double jeopardy, which is 
quixotically organized, fall any distance short of the book's general 
standard of excellence. And, if at times the work strikes a polemical 
note, this is not only understandable but is actually an aid to its 
teaching. 
Nor are Hall and Kamisar completely restrained by any narrow 
view of criminal procedure. Thus, their chapter entitled "Miscella-
neous Problems," while still focusing on the constitutional aspects, 
covers summary punishment for criminal contempt, confrontation 
and cross-examination in post trial and quasi-criminal proceedings, 
and cruel and unusual punishment; similarly, another chapter, the 
only one with a primarily non-constitutional orientation, considers 
the ethical problems of the criminal defense attorney. Although it is 
arguable that both these chapters contain too much material not 
technically on criminal procedure, the fact remains that if this mate-
rial were not taught in this course the chances are it would not be 
taught anywhere in the law school curriculum. On the other hand, 
as long as Hall and Kamisar have given us a casebook dealing with 
the constitutional aspects of criminal procedure, they should have 
included a chapter on speedy trial, which will probably be the next 
of our constitutional guarantees to undergo vigorous and important 
expansion in the next few years. 
The Administration of Criminal Justice is considerably less con-
ventionally organized than the Hall and Kamisar book. Rather than 
being arranged doctrinally, it is arranged chronologically, beginning 
with the arrest, continuing through the verdict, and culminating 
with a final chapter on "fairness." This format makes it much easier 
both to deal with a number of nonconstitutional areas and to use 
comparative material to good advantage. Indeed, with respect to the 
latter, the genesis of the book in the Ford Foundation's Comparative 
Study of the Administration of Justice makes itself apparent in the 
richness and pertinence of the foreign materials. The chronological 
rather than doctrinal orientation of The Administration of Criminal 
Justice thus seems to have the advantage of giving the student a pic-
ture of criminal procedure as an ongoing process as well as allowing 
him to assimilate a good deal of nonconstitutional material. 
The authors' approach, however, is comparatively inefficient as a 
method of conveying constitutional doctrine which, after all, involves 
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the most difficult and rapidly changing areas of criminal procedure. 
For example, in chapter four, "Legal Controls on Arrests," we are 
presented with both Monroe v. Pape and a newspaper story which 
asserts that threats of suit are not effective to deter the police from 
illegal activities. It is well over a hundred pages later, in the chapter 
on "Method of Investigation," that the pros and cons of the exclu-
sionary rule are examined. The chronological organization of The 
Administration of Criminal Justice has another disadvantage. Since 
the authors have not included a chapter on post-conviction remedies, 
they have used the "Method of Investigation" chapter to cover the 
substantive issue in Townsend v. Sain and to shoehorn in that case's 
far more significant habeas corpus discussion. Unfortunately, no sub-
stantive points were considered in Fay v. Noia and therefore the book 
makes no mention of that case. The chronological method, more-
over, increases the likelihood of using materials which are taught in 
other courses, specifically evidence. Thus, the "Method of Investiga-
tion" chapter includes Manguson v. State (the effect of circumstan-
tial evidence), State v. Valdez (admissibility of lie detector testimony 
pursuant to stipulation), and State v. Lindemuth (the admissibility 
of truth serum tests). Other examples are scattered throughout the 
rest of the book, for instance, People v. Spitaliareli (admissibility of 
a withdrawn plea of guilty). 
Despite these shortcomings The Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice is a carefully and intelligently edited book. I find that, even from 
the doctrinal view, its section on free press and fair trial is better 
than that of Hall and Kamisar, and that its comparative materials 
are a valuable help throughout. On the other hand, as between the 
two I must come down on the side of Modern Criminal Procedure 
for two reasons: first, it is more efficient in communicating large 
areas of difficult doctrine in a relatively short (three hour) course; 
and second, although the two books were published less than a year 
apart, the later Hall and Kamisar work avoided the misfortune which 
befell The Administration of Criminal Justice in going to press be-
tween Escobedo and Miranda. (As if this were not enough, Modern 
Criminal Procedure already has a supplement, while The Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice, which needs one far more, does not). 
·while one cannot quarrel with the quality of either of these 
books, it seems to this reviewer that a criminal procedure course can-
not fulfill its function unless it is far more closely integrated with 
the substantive rules of criminal law. The task of integration is 
obviously a difficult one, for, as these two books unfortunately dem-
onstrate, we have not yet even completely solved the simpler problem 
of integrating the constitutional with the non-constitutional aspects 
of criminal procedure. On the other hand, we all know that our pro-
cedural rules greatly influence the types of substantive cases that 
416 Michigan Lq,w Review [VQI. 66 
come to th~ a~tention of ~he co~r~s. an4 it is equalty clear that a 
great part of our procedural doctrine ~ the direct result of decisions 
on q-qestions of substantive law. Indeed, it c;an be argued that only 
when tµe subs~anµve and procedural law of crimes are considered 
togeth~r can we hope to make much headway in either. 
John Kaplan, 
Professor of Law, 
Stanford University 
